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Kinship Between Judith Butler
and Anthropology? A Review Essay
Thomas Strong
Princeton University, usa
abstract This essay critically evaluates Judith Butler’s recent writings on kinship.
In this work, Butler challenges the universalist assumptions of psychoanalysis, hoping
to lay the analytical groundwork for imagining new forms of familial relationship.
Butler examines the way that anthropology and psychoanalysis have constructed
the incest taboo as necessitating heteronormative forms of kinship. Butler’s critique
of kinship, which draws on her theories of subjection, belies her own attachment to
a vision of social life occupied primarily by normative institutions, in particular the
state. I suggest that new forms of kinship must be understood on their own terms,
whether or not they are accorded legitimacy in law or accepted by psychoanalysis.
Anthropology ’s ethnographic practice can emendate an account of subjection and
recognition that obsessively looks to institutions and norms even as it criticizes them.
keywords Kinship, homosexuality, the state, subjection
K inship’
1  is definitely back on the anthropological agenda, but did it
ever leave? Anthropology seems sometimes eager to proclaim its hal-
lowed topics passé –  to ‘rethink’ itself – only  to resurrect those topics
later with occasionally self-congratulatory gestures of re-discovery (Faubion
1 996; Weston 2001 :1 47 –1 5 2 ). In what has become something of a conven-
tional narrative, we read that David Schneider’s provocative and brilliant crit-
iques were instrumental in displacing formalist and/ or functionalist analyses
of  ‘kinship,’ beginning especially in the 1 970s (Carsten 2000; Franklin & McKin-
non 2001 ). Of course, this displacement, which one might lump together with
a turn toward ‘interpretation,’ ‘meaning,’ or, indeed, ‘culture’ (as in, ‘A Cul-
tural Account’), was itself displaced by  attention to power, inequality, and
more recently, transnationalism or the global. But ‘kinship’ is now rediscov-
ered; will ‘culture’ come back into vogue (Ortner 1 997 )? My terminology is
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deliberate. We might chastise anthropology for its fickleness in relation to
some of these analytical categories (fickle or perhaps hypocritical: whether
‘dead’ or not, many monographs went right on describing kinship in much
the same terms in which they always had [Borneman 1 996]), but this is pro-
bably  an inevitable aspect of cultural process, which re-creates itself afresh
by breaking itself apart and finding new combinations, new relations, and new
syntheses. Anthropologists, as much as big men in the highlands of New Guinea,
want to appear attractive and interesting: cultures (including anthropology)
have fashions, and it seems that kinship is back in sty le.
Perhaps this is a response to shifts in the zeitgeist and to the cultural con-
testations taking place in the domains of family , reproductive technologies,
and the life sciences. I remember when my undergraduate advisor predicted
in 1 992  that Woody Allen’s quasi-incestuous affair with his ex-wife’s adopted
daughter would usher in a new attention to kinship in anthropological cir-
cles. The notion was only  half-absurd, notwithstanding Woody’s re-embrace
by  Hollywood in the form of a standing ovation at the 2002  Academy Awards.
The controversy  around his affair concludes Françoise Héritier’s most re-
cent re-theorization of incest (1 999:309-3 1 1 ). But we may  also wish to re-
member that modern kinship studies were ‘invented’ by  a man married to his
mother’s brother’s daughter, a union considered despicable and unnatural
by many of Lewis Henry Morgan’s contemporaries (Trautmann 1 987 :244-
245 ). Kinship appears to be invented and re-invented out of the abrogation
of its constitutive taboos.
Incest is in the public eye. Indeed, I was dumbfounded by  the coincidental
appearance of an article on incest and genetics  on the front page of the New
York Times just as I was completing this essay  (Grady 2002). Making refer-
ence to immigration, state laws, and genetic counseling, the article symbol-
izes many of the concerns and themes of the new kinship studies: the inter-
digitation of biotechnology, globalization, new social movements, and the
state. The article vividly illustrates how contemporary  ideas about kinship
are often rendered within the terms of scientific (and legal) discourse, where
reproduction becomes a matter of managing genetic risk (see also Rabinow
1 992 ; Finkler 2000; Rapp, Heath & Taussig 2001 ), and where science appears
to dissolve and challenge taken-for-granted assumptions about ‘nature’ even
as it reinscribes them.
This is the context for Judith Butler’s challenging and intricately-argued
recent work on kinship, which itself calls for a re-thinking of the incest taboo
as a foundational prohibition. Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death
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(2000) presents a re-reading of Antigone, asking whether she might be read
as a figure of resistance vis-à-vis state-legitimated norms of kinship. And in a
widely-distributed paper, ‘Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?’ (Butler
n.d.), Butler applies her analysis in Antigone’s Claim to the debate over civil
unions in France, a debate in which Butler’s writings themselves were cast as
a dangerous symbol of non-normative identities and relations. Butler’s argu-
ments about the way that the incest taboo is mobilized by  critics of new forms
of familial relationship, and her arguments about the way  that it works in
conjunction with the taboo on miscegenation to secure a particular fantasy
of the self-constitution of the nation-state, deserve careful attention. In this
review, I sketch some aspects of the theoretical and cultural context in which
anthropologists might receive Butler’s ideas before moving on to a closer
inspection of the ideas themselves. In approaching Butler’s work, I draw on
analyses of gender and kinship across the anthropological spectrum, but es-
pecially those that have emerged from the ethnography of New Guinea, where
I conduct research. I am led to ask: What assumptions about social life un-
dergird Butler’s critiques? What do Butler’s accounts of kinship reveal about
her theories of subjection? And what do anthropology and Judith Butler have
to learn from each other?
Kinship
As Sarah Franklin and Susan McKinnon (2001 ), as well as Janet Carsten
(2000), argue, the new interest in kinship often begins with the figure of a
superseded ‘nature.’ Schneider’s critique of early- to mid-twentieth century
kinship studies as exporting Euro-American notions of natural relatedness
to cultures that divide up the world differently  appears to have presaged the
dissolution within Euro-American culture of the foundational status of ‘na-
ture’ as the ground on which human enterprise is both reflected and con-
structed. Thus, Marilyn Strathern’s creative dialogue with Schneider in A fter
Nature (1 992a) is something like a key text for the new studies. ‘Nature’ now
seems, in an often-quoted phrase, ‘enterprised-up’ (Strathern 1 992b), a no-
tion that Paul Rabinow captures in the term ‘biosociality ’ (Rabinow 1 992 ).
This means two things: it w ill not be obvious what ‘kinship’ is, for it will
vary  contextually , and, for that reason, there can probably  be no universal
theory of it (but cf. Lévi-Strauss 1 969, Héritier 1 999). The new kinship stud-
ies apparently  reflect this uncertainty  and provisional particularity. Indeed,
although all of them still deploy the term ‘kinship,’ they differently  modify it.
Kinship is now ‘postmodern’ (Finkler 2000) or ‘nonmodern’ (Carsten 2000:3 1 –
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3 4, after Latour). Is it also ‘flexible’ (Martin 1 994)? ‘Queer’? ‘Open’? From the
audience at the Gauss Seminars in Princeton where Professor Butler initially
presented her interpretation of Antigone, I asked her to define ‘kinship’ since,
although seeming to articulate a devastating critique of certain Western no-
tions of it, she still found herself using the very term she ostensibly  wanted to
exceed or rethink. She said: ‘I want to leave it open for now.’ Perhaps we
should call these studies kinship.
Much as we might want to put such terms as ‘kinship’ and ‘nature’ under
erasure, the new genetics seems sometimes to bring them back with a ven-
geance. In the context of genetic testing and risk counseling, Finkler writes:
‘People are compelled to recognize consanguinity even when in the lived world
they define family  by  a sense of sameness that may  be grounded in friendship
or sharing of affect and interest rather than in genes’ (2000:23 8). Dolgin, in a
comment on Finkler’s paper, points out that recent liability  law-suits per-
taining to doctors who treat patients with genetic ‘disorders’ but fail to notify
extended family  of their potential risk factors, contain arguments that ‘assume
a genetic family, delimited exclusively through reference to shared dna. Within
that family , each person is presumed to mirror each other person and the
larger whole’ (Finkler 2000:25 0), where the whole is a body of carriers of
particular genetic markers. Dolgin worries that the new genetics, activated
in law, dissolves individuality. And as ‘family ’ or kinship become geneticized,
the genetic metaphor might also operate fractally across social scales, much
as ‘blood’ once did (Herzfeld 1 992 ). If the family is a body of uniquely geneti-
cally-configured persons, the state comes to understand its patrimony as a
genetic resource: national dna is born (Rabinow  2000).
In the midst of this confusion as to whether new technologies and rela-
tions either magnify  the capacity of individuals to act as consumers of kin-
ship, that is, to exercise ‘choice’ (Strathern 1 992b; Weston 1 991 ), or whether
those new technologies reconfigure persons as amalgams of dna that does
not belong to them (Rabinow 1 992 ), that is, that erase individuality , can we
really  expect ‘nature’ to be easily  figured? ‘Enterprised-up’ does not, anymore,
capture the whole picture. As Strathern herself has written, apropos current
arguments about intellectual property rights and patent law and the distinc-
tion between ‘discovery ’ and ‘invention,’ Euro-American culture ‘imagines
“nature” existing apart from human creations. It is clear that the life of these
old Euro-American divisions is not over yet. Intellectual property protocols,
notably  patenting, foster the divide between “technology” and “nature” while
presaging its collapse’ (2001 :1 6).
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These are all social trends to which Butler refers: ‘this is a time in which
kinship has become fragile, porous, and expansive’ (2000:23 ). Confusion reigns:
there is no end of ironies. Think of marriage. It is reified as the natural base
of society, and yet it is ‘defended’ in hateful legislation that actively disenfran-
chises populations, such as the ‘Defense of Marriage Act’ in the United States.
Indeed, ‘marriage’ evidently  needs government funding over and above any
tax incentives for persons to marry  and bear children, and in the United States
the Bush administration plans to earmark $1 00 million dollars for programs
that promote it (Toner 2002 ).
There are broad implications for the project of anthropology  in these
developments. By virtue of its supposedly self-evident nature, kinship was
once a kind of global context for gathering together disparate phenomena,
whether those phenomena were conceived as geographically or temporally
separated ‘social systems’ or ‘societies,’ or conceived as different kinds of social
practice (kin terms, naming, marriage prohibitions, patterns of affect, etc.)
within a single such society. Reading Lowie’s Primitive Society (1 920) or Lévi-
Strauss’s Elementary Structures (1 969), one is swamped with all kinds of eth-
nographic detail amassed from nearly  every  corner of the earth, but synthe-
sized within the ethnological project. New analyses of kinship are almost al-
ways ethnographically  and historically  specific. We might then redescribe
the shift in kinship studies as precisely a shift in the ability  of kinship to pro-
vide its own context (Strathern 1 987 ). Carsten and Franklin & McKinnon
assemble essays that, for the most part, describe and analyze particular situ-
ations: since the 1 97 0s, kinship studies ‘have either focused on kinship in a
local or regional ethnographic context, or have made something else –  gen-
der, personhood, houses, bodies, death, procreation –  the main object of com-
parison, with kinship emerging as a prominent subtheme’ (Carsten 2000:6).
It is not the case that there is no comparative gesture at all in the new kinship
studies, but rather that comparison consists in the juxtaposition of particu-
larities, as opposed to the merographic (Strathern 1 992a) encompassment of
part by whole. We witness instead, of course, ‘partial connections’ (Strathern
1 991 , see also Clifford 1 986).
Still, Butler’s focus on ‘intelligibility’ and on what counts as ‘human,’ might
re-introduce such a comparative context. In the new kinship studies, as well
as with the critical cultural studies of science, ‘the human’ appears to be return-
ing as a proper object of anthropological discourse (Scheper-Hughes 2000).
Whether or not this reverses the eclipse of anthropology by  ethnography
remains to be seen (Marcus 2002 ). Arguing against universalist theories of
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kinship and culture, Butler situates herself in relation to Schneider, Strathern,
and the other proponents of the new kinship studies. It is thrilling to see anthro-
pology turned to such diverse aims, at once encompassing grand theory and
grassroots politics, and in the service of a progressive social movement. This is
a salutary  rapprochement with anthropology, and it deserves close inspection.
Queer Unions and Greek Tragedy
In A ntigone’s Claim, Butler suggests that Antigone’s tragic fate signifies not
the intractability  of the laws of the state and the laws of kinship, but rather
their possible alteration. If Antigone’s death marks the boundary of ‘think-
able’ kinship, it therefore also points to kinship’s possible future, a future subject
to transformation and change. The book is comprised largely of detailed and
challenging readings of Hegel and Lacan and their respective readings of Anti-
gone. For Hegel, Antigone offers a parable of the conflict between the law of
the state and the law of the family. Antigone’s death signifies the necessary
transcendence of relations of the state over and above the ties of kinship. An-
tigone’s conscious defiance of a sovereign edict (she buries her brother and
refuses to deny the act) results in her death and belies her ultimate guilt. But
where Hegel reads Antigone’s fatality  as a consequence of the necessary repu-
diation of kinship required for the emergence of the universal morality  of the
state, Butler suggests that Antigone’s death points to the instability  of the
very law that sentences her. Butler writes: ‘One might reapproach Antigone’s
“fatality” w ith the question of whether the limit for which she stands... is not
precisely the trace of an alternate legality that haunts the conscious, public
sphere as its scandalous future’ (2000:40).
Butler challenges the notion that non-normative desire (e.g., the love of
Antigone for her brother Polyneices) must necessarily lead to tragedy. Here,
Butler challenges the Lacanian argument that there is no ‘livable’ position
outside that which is inaugurated by  the Symbolic, by  the signify ing rela-
tions that support the intelligibility  of all subjects. For Butler, Antigone rep-
resents the contingent temporality  of normative social life. She stands for the
possibility of a different future without ever articulating what that future en-
tails. A ntigone’s Claim, then, lays out the critical ground work for imagining
new forms of kinship. Butler implies that these forms will not emerge from a
radical outside or from some point purely exterior to normative relations but
will rather evince a resignification, or tactical appropriation, of the norm.
In Butler’s paper on same-sex civil unions, she applies this critique to a
contemporary political situation, the debate over Le Pacte Civil de Solidarité
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(PaCS) legislation in France, and to similar debates over gay marriage else-
where (see especially  Fassin 2001 ). Here, opposition to legal recognition of
same-sex couples is the occasion for critically  examining theories of culture
that explicitly  and implicitly abject non-conventional sexual and familial re-
lations. In arguments that oppose same-sex unions, ‘Variations on kinship
that depart from normative, dyadic heterosexually-based family  forms se-
cured through the marriage vow are figured not only  as dangerous for the
child, but perilous to the putative natural and cultural laws said to sustain
human intelligibility ’ (Butler n.d., see also 2000:7 0). Butler rejects the sup-
posed universality of these accounts of cultural law. New arrangements and
new technologies, some of which I have described above, demand a retheoriza-
tion of culture and indeed of ‘the human,’ much as they demand a rethinking
of ‘nature.’ The newness of these arrangements is for Butler and for the new
anthropology of kinship much like the otherness of other cultures was for
the modern inventors of kinship (Trautmann 1 987 ). In both cases, the unfa-
miliar must be reckoned with. And in both cases, scholars wish(ed) to resist
mainstream efforts to demonize their subjects. Butler w ishes to re-articulate
a vision of the human that does not work through principles of exclusion.
If Butler seeks to re-humanize the kinship practices of gays and lesbians,
she does so critically , painfully aware that to participate in the game of legi-
timation is already to cede a diacritic function to those one w ishes to criti-
cize. Participating in projects of legitimacy not only  allows one’s opponents
to set the terms of the debate, it also reinscribes a sort of politics of recogni-
tion or belonging in which efforts at inclusion always carry with them (not
infrequently unseen) exclusions and foreclosures. However, Butler here modi-
fies the position of Michael Warner, who argues that all forms of marriage
are unethical (Warner 1 999). Butler is mindful that in the context of the eve-
ryday terror of anti-gay hate crimes and a continuing aids epidemic, this po-
litical and theoretical debate is not simply  a thought experiment. Summing
up the horns of the dilemma, she writes: ‘it becomes increasingly  important
to keep the tension alive between maintaining a critical perspective and making
a political claim’ (Butler n.d.). Antigone, who mimics the mantle of state autho-
rity  in the act of resisting it (Butler 2000:9, 23 ), might be one figure for this
critical ambivalence.
In the French debate, the writings of Lévi-Strauss have been used by  op-
ponents of state endorsement of civil unions (which can encompass but are
not limited to homosexual unions) to argue that any state recognition of same-
sex marriages would threaten French culture because of the universal under-
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pinnings of ‘culture’ itself. Butler suggests that this revival of Lévi-Strauss’s
arguments is ‘spectral’ and ‘anachronistic,’ given the efforts of anthropolo-
gists (many of whom I have just cited) to critique the presumptions of struc-
turalist accounts of kinship (and see Butler 2000:93-94, n. 3 ). Butler suggests
that Lévi-Strauss is used in the French debates because his theory of culture,
or more specifically  of the incest taboo at the threshold of culture, mandates
compulsory heterosexual marriage exchange in the service of clan reproduc-
tion, where ‘clan’ comes to stand for ‘race’ and for ‘nation.’ It is as though
Lévi-Strauss himself is a Father of Culture, for it is his discourse that enables
an authoritative ideal of culture’s very possibility  to be articulated.
We remember that the incest taboo for Lévi-Strauss was a kind of para-
dox, a rule that exists everywhere but is everywhere different, a universal that
is always culturally-specific, and as such can be said to exist at the very bound-
ary between nature and culture. This is how Butler glosses the psychoana-
lytic rendition of his argument: ‘the bar that prohibits the sexual union with
the mother is not arrived at in time but is, in some sense, there as a precon-
dition of individuation, a presumption and support of cultural intelligibility
itself. No subject emerges without this bar or prohibition as its condition...
Indeed the mother is disallowed because she belongs to the father... the fath-
er and the mother exist as logically  necessary  features of the prohibition itself ’
(Butler n.d.).
‘Who is missing here?’
Butler’s synopses of Lévi-Strauss quickly  segue into psychoanalysis, and
the symbolic positions and relations that structure and enable subjecthood.
Indeed, Butler seems to read Lévi-Strauss almost exclusively through Lacan:
this is quite explicit in Antigone’s Claim (Butler 2000:1 7 –1 9, 41 –43 ). Butler’s
subversive reading of Antigone is meant to destabilize and resist the trans-
cendentalizing and universalizing claims of a structuralist psychoanalysis, in-
deed to show how those claims contain the seeds of their own subversion.
Referring to Lévi-Strauss’s emphasis on ‘the rule’ as constitutive of culture,
she writes: ‘Can such a rule, understood as a prohibition, actually operate,
however effectively, without producing and maintaining the specter of its
transgression?’ (2000:1 7 ). This is a tantalizing idea, and it recalls Butler’s ear-
lier critique of Lévi-Strauss in Gender Trouble (1 990:40–41 ). Following James
Boon, we might note that it recalls Lévi-Strauss himself: ‘One theme has re-
mained primary in all Lévi-Strauss’s works, including his magnum opus on
mythology: cultures encode proprieties by  imagining their transgressions’
(1 992 :25 ).
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Butler rightly  points to the analogy between language and kinship in Lévi-
Straussian thought. Lévi-Strauss writes: ‘Although they belong to another
order of reality , kinship phenomena are of the same type as linguistic phe-
nomena’ (1 963 :3 4). However, we may not wish to meld the Lévi-Strauss of
Elementary Structures with the Lévi-Strauss of the Mythologiques, as a consist-
ent theorist of variant but essentially homologous systems of communica-
tion. Boon, writing with Schneider, has shown that the premises and meth-
ods of Lévi-Strauss’s kin and myth analyses are divergent, the prior relying
largely on Western genealogical categories and the later grounded much more
in the native’s point of view (Boon & Schneider 1 97 4, but cf. Boon 1 97 2:62–
1 07 , Boon 1 992 :25 –26), even if the aim of both is to uncover the universal
workings of the human mind in its capacity for symbolic thought.
But what about Lévi-Strauss’s myth analysis? It is surprising that Butler
makes no mention of it, although Lévi-Strauss himself offered an exegesis of
Oedipus that, he said, includes and supersedes the Freudian rendition of the
myth (1 963 :206–231 ). Lévi-Strauss reduces the tragic drama that befalls Oedi-
pus and his kin to the following question: Am I born from one or from two?
The incest taboo pertains to the autochthony of Greek gods and to the facts
of sexual procreation, that is, to questions of identity and difference, and to
the relative reproductivity  of relations of identity and difference.
Incest:Homosexuality::Marriage:Heterosexuality?
Working from different premises, Roy Wagner, a student of Schneider’s,
arrives at similar questions.2 Wagner rejects the Lévi-Straussian emphasis on
‘rule’ and ‘law,’ and suggests that incest is not about Law, but rather about
meaning: ‘law  and normative force should be approached in relative terms, in
so far as they ultimately derive from the contrastive, mutable relations that
generate cultural meaning’ (Wagner 1 972 :607 , original emphasis). I quote his
essay  at length:
We might think of ‘kinship’ in this way as a symbolisation of how various catego-
ries of people should act towards one another, couched in terms of the metaphors
that define humanness. Precisely because they generalise the human condition,
drawing upon ‘vital’ attributes that all persons share in common... the content of
these metaphors has been limited to a few recurrent themes [especially ‘blood’]...
Thus if ‘blood’ is the crucial symbol of humanness, specific bloodlines will be dis-
tinguished as ‘Smith’ blood, ‘Jones’ blood etc. A marriage, or exchange of vital flu-
ids, between two individuals manifesting ‘Smith’ blood would in effect distinguish
the participants as ‘Smiths’ rather than human beings; it would make use of the
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forms through which humanity is constituted to assert individual identity. In the
objective language of ideology , this would amount to a ‘mixing’ of one substance
with itself, which is indeed one of the ways in which incest is commonly  defined.
But by  so doing, by failing to be human and converting a general ideological act
into a private ‘marriage,’ the incestuous offender simultaneously vio lates the mo-
rality  of personal motivation. The ways in which a person can differ from others
are all contingent upon his essential humanity ; if his skills, talents, desires, actions,
etc., fail to  ‘anthropomorphize’ him, the reflection is on his volition. He is then
said to be ‘bestial’ or ‘monstrous,’ to have ‘no shame,’ no tempering of his desires
towards others, to be ‘inhuman’ by  default or inclination (1 972 :607–608 , original
emphasis, see also Schneider 1 968 :3 9).
Incestuous relations render one monstrous, grotesque, bestial, blinded, im-
moral,3 and we converge here again with Butler’s critique, for surely what is
being surveilled in the taboos around incest (and by  implication, its obverse:
legitimate marriage) are the borders and margins of the human. Incest rela-
tions are abject, and they are differentiated as such because they involve self-
mixing. While Wagner emphasizes that incestuous abjection results from what
it means to violate a taboo, rather than the fact of the violation, and indeed, he
therefore questions the very universality  of the taboo, he nonetheless vividly
captures the stakes involved.
If incest is at once the abrogation of a prohibition that inaugurates differ-
ence (minimally , a difference between persons in respect of their moral sexual
availability ; maximally, the difference that enables meaning) and the reinscrip-
tion of that prohibition (as an act, ‘incest’ is only  knowable as such in the
context of its taboo), and if incest entails relations between the same, then it
seems homosexuality  is not outside kinship at all, but rather exists as a dan-
gerous possibility  that, in being foreclosed, secures the boundaries of kin-
ship proper. I might restate this two ways, as a rejoinder to Butler’s titular
question, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual. Is incest always already
homosexual? Or: Is kinship ever heterosexual?
Françoise Héritier’s answer would seem to be: Yes. In a brilliant if prob-
lematic re-theorization of the incest taboo (1 999), Héritier argues that the
taboo on marriage or sex between close relatives in fact derives from the ta-
boo on a person sharing two consanguineous sexual partners. She for her
part re-reads Oedipus to mean not only  that a son shall not sleep with his
mother (though that too), but also that he shall not have sexual relations
with a woman with whom his father has already had sexual relations. Héritier
is a grand theorist, and she almost gleefully  deploys the universalism of her
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argument, saying that it in part depends on the universal and immutable fact
of sexual difference. I wonder if she had Butler’s and Schneider’s work in mind
while conjuring her schema. Héritier does not argue, in fact, that self-mixing
is universally  abhorrent. Rather, the moral evaluation and therefore genera-
tive capacity  of relations of identity  and difference will vary culturally. But as
Butler points out, Héritier is one of those opposed to state-legitimated ho-
mosexual civil unions. If Héritier attends to particularities, her book none-
theless consistently  links two concepts; her second form of incest is a kind of
‘indirect homosexuality.’ Incestuous acts are in Héritier’s view always homo-
sexual in their compulsive mixing of the consubstantial, and the converse
probably  holds true as well: homosexual unions are versions of incest, a cir-
cumvention of foundational truths, and therefore dangerous (and see Faubion
2001 :1 4).
If incest pertains to the differential fecundity  of relations of identity  and
difference (and Lévi-Strauss himself offered one image of barren homosexual
couples strolling on the boardwalks of Fire Island (1 992  [1 95 5 ]:1 63 )), what
sorts of differences are we talking about? Differences of social origin? Gen-
der difference? A Melanesian response to accounts that suggest that repro-
duction can only  be linked to an irreducible difference might be to point out
that such difference devolves from social activity rather than being the pre-
condition for it (Wagner 1 97 7 ; Gillison 1 987 ; Strathern 1 988).
Working with Wagner’s concept of the analogical flow of relationships,
Gillian Gillison has interpreted a body of myths among the Gimi, of the East-
ern Highlands of New Guinea. Gillison describes a mythical world of indistin-
guishable identities: a woman appears to bear herself as her own child, the
father of the child is simultaneously  the woman’s brother and her husband,
the growing fetus is the father/ brother’s penis, semen and mother’s milk are
the same thing in different forms. Social life consists in the constant, one might
say performative, attempt to undo this identity and to create the very distinc-
tions that Héritier claims are universally  foundational. In 1 988 , and putting
Gillison and Wagner’s work to good use, Strathern wrote: ‘Gimi symboliza-
tion establishes the male or female character of a person as an incident, an
event, a historical moment created in time. What differentiates men and women,
then, is not the maleness or femaleness of their sexual organs but what they do
with them. Whether a tube turns out to be a penis or a birth canal depends on
how it is and has been activated’ (1 988 :1 28 ). What Strathern articulates for
the sexing of bodies, Gillison articulates for the separation of relationships:
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Kin relations originate in, or are devised in opposition to, culturally constituted
fantasies of incest... they are at their core undifferentiated... In these terms, the soci-
ally  cohesive ‘work’ that initiation ritual begins and that marriage and exchange
carry  forward is to create and maintain distinctions among relationships. [In Gimi
myth] the mother’s brother is ‘initially present’ –  not primarily as a wife-giver but
as ego’s original father, as his mother’s mythic ‘first husband.’ I propose that elimi-
nating the mother’s brother is a central problem for the patrilineal Gimi, an eter-
nal dilemma which they attempt to solve by making regular payments to  him
(1 987 :1 70,1 68).
To return to Butler’s account of Lévi-Strauss, I suggested that her image of
the logically-necessary  aspects of the incest taboo was missing somebody.
Gillison’s work reveals just who that is: the mother’s brother. What the in-
cest prohibition means is not simply that the mother belongs to the father
(as Butler states), but that she has come from elsewhere, and in that sense
does not belong to the father at all. (Indeed, in many cultures of the high-
lands of Papua New Guinea, the identity  between husband and wife is not
achieved until after the death of the mother/ wife’s last child, and then it is
only  achieved when wealth exchanges honor even as they separate the con-
nection of a mother’s child to the mother’s natal clan [Gillison 1 987 ].) Lévi-
Strauss’s ‘atom’ of ‘kinship,’ we remember, includes the ‘family ’ of parents
and child, but also always already the mother’s brother (note however that
what anthropologist’s have conventionally  called the ‘avunculate’ is not there-
fore universal in the same way  that the incest taboo is (Lowie 1 920:81 –83 )).
But this is already askew. The logically-necessary  aspects of ‘kinship’ are not
‘terms,’ but relations: ‘In order for a kinship structure to exist, three types of
family  relations must always be present: a relation of consanguinity , a rela-
tion of affinity , and a relation of descent –  in other words, a relation between
siblings, a relation between spouses, and a relation between parent and child’
(Lévi-Strauss 1 963 :46).
What are we to make of Butler’s omission of the mother’s brother? To be
sure, Butler also refers to the elsewhereness of the mother/ wife: ‘the incest
taboo functions in Lévi-Strauss not only  to secure the exogamous reproduc-
tion of children but also to maintain a unity  to the “clan” through compul-
sory exogamy as it is articulated through compulsory heterosexuality. The
woman from elsewhere makes sure that the men from here will reproduce
their own kind’ (Butler n.d.). Butler here is formulating an argument about
the racialist project of French national identity, and in A ntigone’s Claim she
cites Lévi-Strauss’s ‘Race and History ’ (1 97 6 [1 95 2 ]):
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one can see in the work of Lévi-Strauss the implicit slide between his discussion of
kinship groups, referred to as clans, and his subsequent writing on race and his-
tory in which the laws that govern the reproduction of a ‘race’ become indissociable
from the reproduction of the nation. In these latter writings, he implies that cul-
tures maintain an internal coherence precisely  through rules that guarantee their
reproduction, and though he does not consider the prohibition of miscegenation,
it seems to be presupposed in his description of self-replicating cultures (2000:7 4).
Let me suggest that there is a bias in this reading of Lévi-Strauss, a bias which
takes the object of Lévi-Strauss’s theory to be the identity of subjects, whether
we conceive of those subjects as persons or clans. Reading backwards through
Lacan to Lévi-Strauss, Butler seems to arrive at a portrait of Lévi-Strauss as
unilineal descent theorist. Keeping the atom of kinship in mind, and being
mindful that the atom is not coextensive w ith the elementary structures but
rather the logical prerequisite for the generation of those structures (Boon
1 990:1 04), we remember that the concern for Lévi-Strauss is not the identity
of the clan at all, but rather the initiation of the vis-à-vis of social life. A clan
can only  be known relationally of course, and it is the relations that interest
Lévi-Strauss, not the identities. Any social unit is enriched by  its relational
universe. At every  level of abstraction –  two individuals, two groups, two ci-
vilizations –  it is the creative possibilities enabled by relational difference that
are the very  essence of the social, and the social is the very  essence of the
human. Indeed, far from being an account of cultural reproduction as trans-
missible racial purity , Lévi-Strauss’s ‘Race and History ’ rejects any biological
basis for ‘race,’ rejects evolutionist arguments that proclaim the superiority
of Western civilization, rejects the view that some cultures are outside of his-
tory, and suggests that no single civilization can ever itself take credit for its
accomplishments, since no culture exists in isolation, and if it did, it would
shrivel and die.4  It is as though Lévi-Strauss sought himself to burn the straw
man of a reified structuralism before its subsequent critics could.
As a theory of subjects who are passionately attached –  by  necessity  –  to
that which oppresses and produces them, could we expect Butler’s critique
itself to escape such a paradoxical circumstance? It is worth asking: what does
her resolute focus on authority  and authoritative discourse foreclose? In But-
ler’s work, there is an analogy between the State that is performatively in-
stantiated, but nevertheless transcendent, and the Symbolic, in that these both
seem to be opposed to something like ‘the social.’ Butler consistently  refers
to the complex variability of social life, a social life that exceeds the efforts of
the State and the Symbolic to regulate it. Do Butler’s dazzling extrapolations
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of Althusserian interpellation (recall the lone pedestrian subjecting herself to
the call of state power) and Lacanian subjection (the child called into exist-
ence by  the discourse of the Father) exercise their own foreclosure on her
theory (see especially  Butler 1 997 b)? Remembering the avunculate, we might
say that the social field of interpellation is much more complex than either of
these ideal types might suggest.
It may seem disingenuous or misguided to criticize a theorist for being
attached to forms of authority  when she has been instrumental in theorizing
modes of politics and resistance that exceed state-oriented norms (see espe-
cially  Butler 1 997a). It might also be naïve merely to reinscribe a division
that Butler identifies and seeks critically  to analyze: between a politics of
legitimation and a politics of the radical. It sounds like I have got it back-
wards. But look at the evidence of her accounts of ‘kinship.’ If the rendering
of Lévi-Strauss is truncated by  a psychoanalytic focus on subjection, the field
of the social is foreshortened by  the resolute attention to law and legality.5
Alongside the mother’s brother, we may wish to ask: Where is the church
and its complex history with respect to the family and marriage? We may
also wish for more analysis of the fact of gay marriage. Butler makes no ref-
erence for example to the significant ethnographic work of Ellen Lewin on
same-sex commitment ceremonies, nor to Lewin’s work on lesbian mothers
(Lewin 1 993 , 1 998). If Schneider taught us anything about kinship, it is pre-
cisely that we have to attend to what it is that people think they are up to
when they relate to one another. And this is not necessarily  a plea to articu-
late the ‘voice’ of the native or to recover the ‘experience’ of gay subjects.
Rather, to paraphrase Strathern, ‘What we analyze as [kinship is] situated
within specific theories which actors hold about [relations] as such. Our sub-
ject matter must surely be the manner in which we are to situate their theo-
ries w ithin our analyses’ (1 984:44).
And so I conclude by  pondering the fact of gay marriage, beyond the ef-
forts of any authority  to regulate it. For gay marriage is happening. But why?
Ethnographic Coda
At a club called Sugar in San Francisco’s South of Market district, on a
Saturday night, the dj plays house music manifestos. People are sweaty, dancing.
A singer speaks over the driving thud of a bass line: ‘House music will set you
free. Join us children.’ Cue excerpts from Martin Luther King’s ‘I Have a Dream’
speech. And then a shrill screech as the dj turns down the music and grabs a
mic. He says that he has a special announcement. He intends to marry  his
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boyfriend, but has not asked him yet. Over the mic, to his boyfriend, he asks:
‘Will you marry me?’ The crowd, smushed together in drug-addled libidinal
abandon, cheers. Cue the volume. Resume dancing.
What will be the topoi of queer ‘kinship’? Will they devolve from ‘choice’
(Weston 1 991 )? Or ‘care’ (Borneman 2001 )? Will gay kinship require con-
stitutive prohibitions? Will it be, as it evidently  is for revelers at gay discos, a
practice of freedom? A form of ethical subjectivation (Faubion 2001 )? Is it an
ambivalent mimicry of heterosexual norms? Or is gay marriage and kinship
the sign of a normative subjection, a kind of melancholia, in which persons
remain compulsively attached to forms of love from which they have been
violently excluded? Why indeed do gays and lesbians continue to subject-
ivize themselves and their relationships in familial terms, where ‘gay mother’
might refer to a lesbian w ith children or to a drag queen and her coterie of
devotees? What does it mean? We will not be able to say  without inspection.
Butler’s critiques of Law, and her accounts of performativity and subjec-
tion, have given us lucid analytical tools for understanding the uncertain and
tenuous nature of that which we take for granted. She has argued away  the
inevitability  of any particular form of politics; she advocates an always al-
ready critically-self-conscious form of activism. In arguing through the so-
lidity of the regulatory ideal, she has shown how the practices of abject popu-
lations can appropriate and deform those norms and forms of legitimacy that
might inveigle them, as when a man legally  adopts his lover in order to se-
cure citizenship rights for him (Borneman 2001 ).
But anthropology is particularly well-suited to emendating an account of
subjection and recognition that obsessively looks to institutions and norms
even as it criticizes them. Our theories of culture and power need to match
the creativity  of subjects, a creativity  whose shape we cannot presuppose.
What form of recognition occurs when sweaty throngs cheer a disco mar-
riage proposal? When mtv’s ‘reality ’ show broadcasts a gay marriage between
an hiv+  Latino man and his African-American lover? Or, indeed, when a
bride, beneath a shimmering head-dress of black feathers, is embraced by
the sisters and mothers of her new husband’s clan in the Asaro Valley of New
Guinea? Does any state see these acts? More importantly, do we?
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Notes
   1 . To place ‘kinship’ in quotes throughout this review would be a cumbersome
affectation. Even when absent, quotes are implied whenever the term ‘kinship’ is
used here: this article pertains both to the relational practices of persons and to
the representation of those practices in anthropological and critical thought. We
should resist too-easily  re-naturalizing ‘kinship’ as a proxy for either everyday
notions of ‘family’ or theoretical notions of ‘social structure.’
   2 . On the whole, Wagner’s work represents a sustained critique of Lévi-Strauss’s
theories of kinship and myth.
  3 . They may even render one godlike, see Boon 1 990:94–1 1 4.
  4. Apropos the Lévi-Straussian emphasis on dialectics of identity and meaning,
Boon writes: ‘What communicates is already corrupted; no pristine purity  can
speak’ (1 992 :22).
   5 . Compare Borneman’s warning that ‘the state and its law remain the most powerful
institutional force in our contemporary  world conferring rights and privileges.
Very  few people can afford to live outside this law’ (2001 :24). My question is
how we can see those who are outside this law if we have already decided that
such a position is unaffordable.
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